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Abstract
Norway maintains a complex system of activity or type speciﬁc coupled payments
which account for a large share of farm income. Most of the payment rates are
negatively related to farm size and are higher in remote areas compared to central
regions. We present and use a newly developed recursive-dynamic multi-commodity
model (Agrispace) with CES production functions depicting regional farm clusters
derived from the full farm population. Using this model, we simulate impacts of
current and alternative subsidy policies on production, prices, input use, income
and farm structural change. Mapping cluster results to each farm along with beha-
vioural rules allows estimation of individual proﬁts and farm exits. Our results indi-
cate that, in the short run, the current policy regime seems to support the policy
objective of maintaining a variety of farms in all parts of Norway. In the long run,
farm structural change is less aﬀected by a policy reform that leaves total support
levels unchanged.
Keywords: Norway; policy reform; programming model; structural change.
JEL classifications: Q18, Q12, C61.
1. Introduction
The design of agricultural policies has become more farm-speciﬁc in most OECD
countries over the past decades in the sense that market support has been replaced by
payments determined by individual farm characteristics such as land areas, endow-
ments, production systems and intensity. Recent examples from the European Union’
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) include the Small Farmers Scheme that simpliﬁes
the Single Farm Payment requirements for small farms, ‘greening’ and ‘capping’ agri-
environmental payments under Pillar II. A certain level of ‘cross-compliance’ has been
part of agri-environmental payments since the late 1980s (Burton and Schwarz, 2013).
In Norway, most subsidies are based on coupled payments with rates which are nega-
tively related to farm size (i.e. crop levels, animal herds or the farm as such) (OECD,
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2016a). In addition, payment rates are regionally diﬀerentiated with higher rates in
disadvantaged regions. These coupled payments represent a large share of agricultural
income, considerably exceeding market based gross margins in most farming activities
despite very high border protection which drives domestic market prices well above
world market levels (OECD, 2016a). Furthermore, distances are large so that trans-
port costs can be important for input and output prices faced by Norwegian farmers,
and are partly subject to policy intervention.
Analysis of the current Norwegian agricultural policy requires detail for types of
production, farm sizes and regional resolution. However, no appropriate state-of-the-
art quantitative tool to inform domestic agricultural policy decision-making in Nor-
way with these features is currently available. Jordmod (Bullock et al., 2016) was
speciﬁcally developed as an agricultural sector model for Norway, but has method-
ological weaknesses. It is a linear programming (LP)-based system which ﬁrst opti-
mises typical farms and next, taking these optimal programmes as ﬁxed, determines
‘optimal’ weights in the farm populations to clear domestic markets. It struggles with
the typical over-specialisation of LPs in its farm type supply module and unrealistic
assumptions underlying the market module. As a complement to Jordmod, speciﬁ-
cally for market- and trade-based analysis, a Norwegian module for CAPRI (Britz
and Witze, 2014) has been developed which also includes regional average payments
for many of the Norwegian subsidy schemes, but does not provide data for the farm
type extension of CAPRI (Gocht and Britz, 2011). Simulating Norwegian domestic
policy reforms with CAPRI is hence conﬁned to varying available average regional
payment rates, which is insuﬃciently detailed for realistic policy analysis.
To ﬁll this gap, we present a newly developed tool, Agrispace, to inform agricul-
tural policy decision-making in Norway. The basic concept is to utilise information
from the full population of Norwegian farms applying for direct payments in a model
with explicit demand and production functions. Agrispace is inspired by the complex-
ity of Norwegian agricultural policies, but in principle is applicable to any other regio-
nal, national or European level where similar data are available.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview
of Norwegian agricultural policies. After a brief presentation of the model’s major
building blocks in section 3, scenarios aimed at illustrating and assessing the model’s
features are introduced in section 4. The scenarios are built around a payment imple-
mentation uniform with respect to farm size and regional location. Section 5 reports
on changes in prices, supply, farm income and structural change. We conclude and
discuss strengths and weaknesses of the model in the ﬁnal section.
2. Norwegian Agricultural Policies
Using budgetary spending and market distortion as indicators, Norwegian society
seems to put a high value on maintaining agricultural production and preventing
higher rates of structural change in the Norwegian farm population as well as preserv-
ing a degree of self-suﬃciency in food markets. In 2015, overall support to agriculture
was 26.3 billion NOK (OECD, 2016b), equivalent to around €2.94 billion. Border
protection and budget support amounted to 12.1 billion NOK (€1.35 billion) and 14.2
billion NOK (€1.59 billion), respectively. Market sales valued at world market prices
represented 13.9 billion NOK (€1.55 billion). In eﬀect, around 60% of the sector’s
gross production value was related to government intervention and ﬁnanced by either
tax-payers or consumers (OECD, 2016b).
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In the latest White paper on Norwegian agricultural policy (Ministry of Agriculture
and Food, 2016), the four stated main goals are food security, agriculture all over the
country, increased value creation, and a sustainable agriculture with lower greenhouse
gas emissions. In its debate on the White paper, the Parliament speciﬁed that ‘agricul-
ture all over the country’ implies a diverse agriculture with a varied farm structure
(Norwegian Parliament, 2016). It argues that natural conditions in many rural areas
limit farm size such that there is a need to support the existence of small farms as a
precondition to maintain agriculture all over the country.
Such support comes in many diﬀerent programmes. Subsidies are mainly paid
based on output, animals and farmed land. In addition, there are signiﬁcant invest-
ment programmes and tax allowances for income from agriculture. Payment rates are
commonly based on actual rather than historic farm production and thus are coupled
to production decisions. The OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE)-database dis-
tinguished 97 diﬀerent payment schemes for Norway in 2015 (Table 1). There were 21
payment schemes with farm size degressive payments rates only, seven schemes with
regional diﬀerentiation only and 6 programmes where rates diﬀered both with regard
to farm size and region. Although the support granted in each individual scheme
might be small, the total share of budget support associated with farm size and/or
regional diﬀerentiated payment rates is almost 70%. In addition, support at the farm
level was capped based on farm size in nine programmes, which in sum account for
almost 50% of overall budget support to agriculture.
Norwegian agricultural policies also comprise supply control at market level. Most
important for the purpose of the model are farm-speciﬁc milk quotas which are trad-
able only at the county level. As Norway consists of 18 counties, the quota regime is
an important tool to prevent concentration of dairy farming in a few more favourable
regions, which has impacts for the majority of the farms given the importance of milk
production in a country with limited arable land.
That brief overview shows that individual farm characteristics have to be taken into
account in any ex-ante economic analysis of Norwegian agriculture policy reforms.
Whereas access to individual farm data is often a key limiting factor in policy evalua-
tion in many countries, the Norwegian Freedom of Information Act ensures that data
regarding state aid paid to legal entities or private persons including agricultural sub-
sidies have to be made public on request. Thus, annual data at individual farm level
on the number of hectares of eligible crops and the number of eligible animals are
Table 1
Characteristics of direct payments in Norway
Number Amount (million NOK) Share (%)







Payments with both FSD and RD 6 1,419 10.0
Payments with cap for total payment amount 9 7,005 49.8
Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2016a,b).
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stored in a Direct Payment Database and can be requested from the authorities. The
database provides data in electronic form back to 1999. Given the importance of bud-
get support for farm income and that payments apply to almost any crops grown and
almost any animals kept on farms (including mink, bees, deer, rabbit, alpaca, donkeys
and lama), only a few farms are not covered by the Direct Payment Database. How-
ever, data on production costs and revenues as well as farm-household characteristics
are not included in this database.
It is not clear that the existing Norwegian policy mix delivers the desired outcomes
in a cost eﬃcient way. For any larger legislative project,the European Union (EU)
requires a formal impact assessment and explicitly recommends for policy arenas such
as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the application of economic modelling in
its impact assessment guideline (EU, 2009). In contrast, agricultural policy decisions
in Norway are mostly not informed by quantitative tools and impact assessment. That
might partly reﬂect that farmers’ association and the government led by the agricul-
tural minister decide on an annual basis on changes in subsidies, without too much
interest by the general public about budgetary consequences and without major
reforms in policy instruments such as those undertaken in the CAP over the last dec-
ades. The observed lack of quantitative analysis could also reﬂect the lack of existing
tools and models which could inform the policy debates. Current tools lack features
to match salient outcomes with the information needs of stakeholders and a state-of-
the-art methodology (see Podhora et al., 2013).
3. Overview on the Agrispace Model
The agricultural sector in Norway is small in economic terms (about 1.5% of gross
domestic product (GDP) including considerable subsidies) and characterised by small
shares for any agricultural and food product in world markets. In contrast to most
other European countries, research can gain access to data on the full farm popula-
tion. Against that background, the Agrispace model is built around the following
building blocks: (1) small country assumption, i.e. ﬁxed world market prices, in a par-
tial equilibrium (PE) setting, (2) consideration of price diﬀerentiation inside Norway
based on a Spatial Equilibrium approach, and (3) a recursive-dynamic link between
results for each farm in Norway and results for aggregate farm types at regional level.
More speciﬁcally, Agrispace is a recursive-dynamic multi-commodity model
(MCM) with behavioural equations to determine demand and explicit production
functions for agricultural sectors, the feed compound and the dairy industry, similar
to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models or the Policy Evaluation Model
(PEM) of the OECD (Martini, 2011). Based on the spatial equilibrium (SPE)
approach, we consider commodities as homogenous, such that price diﬀerences in
space depend on transport margins and policy instruments such as import tariﬀs, and
not on spatially diﬀerentiated quality diﬀerences as in the Armington approach (Arm-
ington, 1969). SPE reﬂects spatial arbitrage, i.e. price diﬀerences between two regions
cannot exceed the bi-lateral per unit transport and transaction costs. A regular
demand system is necessary to calculate welfare results from any price changes result-
ing from changes in agricultural policy. We assume that markets are competitive, and
that producers minimise costs and consumer utility, standard assumptions in PE and
CGE models. These assumptions are reﬂected ﬁrstly in the choice of functional form
and parameterisation for the demand side: we use (semi-)ﬂexible function forms and
ensure global adherence to regularity conditions. Secondly, for the supply side, we use
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ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) derived from constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production functions under constant-returns-to-scale in combination with constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) functions to describe factor supply, the usual
approach in CGEs. Jointly, the functional forms and parameterisation allow for con-
sistent welfare analysis with the model. Given this structure, the model’s equations
depict four types of (in)equalities: (1) FOCs derived from cost minimising under expli-
cit production functions which deﬁne input demand at given prices and per unit pro-
duction cost, (2) the demand equations which deﬁne demand quantities at the
endogenous prices, (3) market clearing conditions which deﬁne regional prices, and
(4) spatial arbitrage which simultaneously determines inter-regional trade ﬂows and
diﬀerences in regional prices. As mentioned above, we treat international prices as
ﬁxed. An overview of the data ﬂow in the model for each annual step is shown in
Figure 1. For detailed technical and methodological documentation of the model,
refer to the online model documentation (Britz, 2017).
3.1. Supply side
The supply side of the models breaks down each of the 32 regions into 4–16 clusters
of farms which are modelled by aggregate production and factor supply functions.
Each region consists of municipalities that belong to the same county, the same zone
for acreage and landscape payments, and the same agricultural region. The latter cate-
gory divides Norway into eight regions with similar natural conditions for agriculture
Figure 1. Flowchart of the Agrispace model
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(NIBIO, 2016). The farm clusters in each region are derived by statistical analysis
from 42,180 individual farms applying for direct payments in the calendar year 2014
and depicting almost the entire Norwegian farm population. Some farms do not apply
for subsidies, and some farms have been dropped because of very small or less rele-
vant production activities (e.g. horses, bees). That implies that each cluster represents
an average of 140 farms. The cluster analysis was undertaken using the kmean-
approach in Stata which is an iterative procedure that partitions the data into k
groups or clusters (StataCorp, 2011). As k is exogenously given, the kmean-approach
has been run for k = 1, . . ., 20. In order to determine the optimal number of k, two
tests have been applied: the within sum of squares (WSS) (Makles, 2012) and the
Calinski-Harabasz pseudoF (Calinski and Harabasz, 1974). The optimal number of k
has been ﬁnally determined by visual inspection of the graphs generated from the
WSS and the pseudo for a given k. A kink in the WSS-curve indicates the optimal k as
do large values of the pseudoF.
Output generation for the 19 agricultural products covered by the model (six types
of cereals, rapeseed, pulses, potatoes; tomatoes, other vegetables; apples, pears and
peaches as an aggregate, other fruits, fodder production, beef, pork and poultry meat,
eggs and raw milk) and input use of each cluster is described by product-speciﬁc
nested CES production functions with constant returns to scale. Capital, land – diﬀer-
entiated by arable, permanent and grassland – labour, general intermediate inputs,
fodder and concentrates are the six input categories identiﬁed. The top nest of the pro-
duction function includes the intermediate composite, a composite of labour and capi-
tal, all feed (for animals) and for crops, land. Feed for ruminants is diﬀerentiated in a
further nest comprising fodder – assumed to be not traded across farm clusters or
regions – and a feed compound composite.
The production activities compete at cluster farm level for the two quasi-ﬁxed fac-
tors: capital and labour; and the three land categories. That competition is described
by CET-functions; we hence assume that input qualities used in the diﬀerent produc-
tion branches in one (aggregate farm) diﬀer such that factor returns need not be iden-
tical. Total supply of capital and labour to the cluster of farms is driven by a linear
function depending on the relation of average returns on farm and oﬀ-farm prices
which can hence be understood as a farm-household model with preferences for on/
oﬀ farm employment and capital use, and diminishing returns to capital and labour
use on and oﬀ-farm.
The three land categories feature regional markets, where the total land stock reacts
with land supply elasticities to changes in average regional returns. The average regio-
nal returns represent a CET nest which distributes land to the diﬀerent farm group
(clusters) according to average returns to each land category in the cluster. That in
turn implies that land markets are not perfect: returns between the aggregate cluster
farms are not identical.
Feed demand for each production branch is depicted by a CES function which dif-
ferentiates between diﬀerent types of compounds and single feed stuﬀs (soy cake, cere-
als based, dairy based and other). A feed compound industry mixes these compounds
together based on cost minimisation under a CES technology comprising labour, cap-
ital and the individual products mixed together. The dairy industry features a CES
technology combining raw milk, labour and capital to one output which is CET trans-
formed to the individual dairy outputs (butter, skimmed milk powder, cheese, fresh
milk products, cream, concentrated milk, whole milk powder). There is no other expli-
cit food processing industry, rather, ﬁxed processing margins diﬀerentiate producer
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price net of per-unit subsidies from ﬁnal consumer prices which implies constant-
returns-to-scale such that no change in welfare in food processing needs to be reﬂected
in the model.
The model hence simultaneously simulates allocation decisions at the level of farm
groups as in a classical aggregate programming model, however using non-linear pro-
duction functions, and aspects of structural change, depicted by simulating changes in
labour and ﬁnancial assets (=capital) on and oﬀ farm and competition in land markets
between farm groups. At the same time it generates, as a typical MCM, changes in
production, demand, trade and prices at the national level, and from the SPE
approach, also at regional level inside Norway.
To explain the interactions on the supply side depicted in the model, consider an
example relevant for the policy analysis in the results section. Norwegian subsidies in
milk production are degressive, i.e. small farms receive higher per unit subsidies.
Assume that this diﬀerentiation by farm size is removed. The returns to factors to
milk production in small farms will drop as a result. This has three consequences.
First, at the farm level, activities other than milk production competing for labour,
land and capital will be expanded in small dairy farms. Second, at the household level,
despite that re-allocation, average returns to factors in small dairy farms will drop
and the household will (re)invest less in the farm and also move labour from the farm
into the household, for oﬀ-farm work or other purposes. Third, in the land market,
the small dairy farms will lose competiveness and part of their land will be shifted to
other farms and non-agricultural use. The opposite eﬀects will be observed for larger
dairy farms where per unit subsidies to milk production will increase when subsidies
no longer depend on farm size. Next, we discuss how such simulated changes interact
with the micro level.
3.2. Estimating changes at single farm level
As mentioned above, the MCM model operates on the supply side at the level of farm
groups inside each of the 32 regions, our farm clusters, which were deﬁned by statisti-
cal cluster analysis taking acreages and herd size of the diﬀerent activities into account
as discussed above.
In order to re-calculate the premiums and estimate farm exits, we map the simu-
lated changes in output quantities and land use in each simulated year in relative
terms into each single farm reported by the agricultural census. As the netput quanti-
ties for the each cluster are consistent to the sum over the single farms at the bench-
mark, applying relative changes to each farm maintains the consistency between
micro level and the partial equilibrium model results during simulation as well. That
rather simplistic approach based on relative changes is often applied in studies com-
bining macro- and micro-simulation (cf. Bourguignon et al., 2008 for use in macro-
micro simulations for general or Deppermann et al., 2016 for an application to single
farms). Resulting changes in labour and capital costs at micro level reﬂect simulated
changes in production output level and cost shares relative to the originally estimated
labour and capital costs of each single farm. From there, it is possible to estimate the
individual farm proﬁts, given that the detailed premiums are calculated for each farm
as well. The approach seems especially suitable in our context given the relatively high
level of diﬀerentiation in our farm group approach where each cluster represents on
average only 140 farms, and the attributes in the cluster analysis are equal or strongly
related to the variables where uniform relative changes are applied.
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Deriving per unit subsidy at the aggregate level from micro results is important as
activity-speciﬁc subsidies are diﬀerentiated by enterprise size such that, for example,
the ﬁrst cows receive higher premiums. Furthermore, for certain payment schemes,
total payments to a farm cannot exceed given thresholds. We diﬀerentiate the twelve
most important diﬀerent payments schemes in terms of budget support in detail plus
an aggregate residual category which ensures consistency with the PSE data of the
OECD.
To determine farm exits, we employ a simple algorithm based on a farm size-speci-
ﬁc proﬁt cut-oﬀ level and a stochastic component. The sample comprises a larger
number of relatively small farms with low proﬁts, often involved in sheep farming and
keeping horses. Applying a proﬁt cut-oﬀ based on a comparison with factor returns
out-of-agriculture will not reﬂect intrinsic motives which might well explain the deci-
sion to continue to operate these small-scale farms. Statistics show that a signiﬁcant
number of farmers do not leave the sector despite negative income. On average, about
12,000 farmers (or 27% of all farmers) had negative taxable income from agriculture
for each year between 2004 and 2015, while only 1,700 farmers exited the sector
(Statistics Norway, 2017a). Furthermore, more than half of the farms with less than
0.5 ha had negative taxable income from agriculture in 2015, while that share was only
8% for farms with more than 50 ha (Statistics Norway, 2017b). Hence, we assume a
lower cut-oﬀ level for smaller farms. The farm-speciﬁc minimum proﬁt increases lin-
early from a proﬁt of €–25,000 for farms with less than 0.1 ha to a proﬁt of €2,500 for
farms with 20 ha. The cut-oﬀ level remains constant for all farms above that size. The
farm-speciﬁc minimum proﬁt is hence size speciﬁc. Next, we allow for diﬀerent shares
of capital costs being accounted for, assuming that the remaining diﬀerence between
revenues plus premiums minus variable costs will remunerate labour and land. Fur-
thermore, we randomly disturb the proﬁt cut-oﬀ for each farm based on a normal dis-
tribution to reﬂect stochastic impacts on exit decisions such as death, illness and
accidents, breakdown of farm machinery, but also events such as marriage or an
unexpected labour opportunity oﬀ-farm. The standard deviation of the stochastic ele-
ments depends on the yearly changes of proﬁts corrected for the change in the overall
wage rate: a drop (or increase) in each individual proﬁt increases (or decreases) the
standard deviation and thus increases (or decreases) the chance of a farm exit. To
summarise, exit conditions reﬂect the size of an individual farm’s proﬁt and its yearly
change, with a stochastic element. The diﬀerent parameters used in the farm exit mod-
ule have been calibrated to arrive under the benchmark simulation over a decade to
the about the same rate of structural change as observed ex post.
Next, we need to map the changes resulting from individual farm exits back to the
cluster level. In order to do so, we ﬁrst calculate the relative change in the output
quantities of the cluster by subtracting from the current output level the output of the
exiting farms, in relation to current cluster output. Given that the clusters operate
under constant-return-to-scale, we can use that relative correction factor as well to
correct input use for the individual products. That also implies that calibrated costs
shares are not aﬀected. In order to get a feedback from these changes on the simula-
tion behaviour, we recalibrate the CET-factor supply nests for the next year simula-
tion with the MCM part such that the reduced input demand quantities would be
demanded at the old input prices which reﬂect the behaviour of the non-exiting farms
under the last simulated market and policy conditions. That in turn implies that the
feedback from structural change on the solution in the next year is driven by the fac-
tor supply functions which are unchanged. With reduced factor demand due to farm
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exits, factor prices in the next year’s solution of the MCM part such as land prices will
drop, and the remaining farm cluster will face lower prices which will lead to adjust-
ments in factor use in the remaining farms and consequently to changes in outputs
and output prices. Note that feedback via output market is limited as border prices
are exogenous. Regional prices compared to the benchmark will hence only change if
either border policy instruments change or regions switch from a net-supplier to a net-
demander reﬂecting spatial arbitrage.
3.3. Technical implementation
Similar to most other tools in that ﬁeld (e.g. Britz and Kallrath, 2012), we use GAMS
(General Algebraic Modelling System, Bisschop and Meeraus, 1982) to encode the
model and all necessary data and parameter transformation. Coding conventions, for
example with regard to a modular structure and use of mnemonics, follow guidelines
developed for CAPRI (Britz, 2010). For the Bayesian based parameter calibrations,
we use CONOPT (Drud, 1994; version 2014), the market model is solved in PATH
(Ferris and Munson, 2000) as an MCP. A Graphical User Interface allows steering
the model and results exploitation, which is implemented in GGIG (GAMS Graphical
Interface Generator, Britz, 2014).
4. Scenarios
A series of model runs was conducted to better understand model behaviour and
model responsiveness to certain exogenous policy shocks. As the main motivation
for developing the model was to study the eﬀects of policy reform on the regional
distribution of agricultural activities and farm structural change, the scenarios
were built around combinations of the abolition of the payments’ farm-size degres-
sivity and regional diﬀerentiation. As the model is recursive-dynamic, we also
included two scenarios to study the eﬀects of varying the timing of the policy
changes. Table 2 identiﬁes the seven scenarios for which model runs have been
performed.
The abolition of farm-size degressivity and regional diﬀerentiation was imple-
mented in the same way in all scenarios in order to allow comparability across scenar-
ios. Removing farm-size degressivity of subsidies was based on calculating uniform




Abolition of . . . in year . . .




(4) NoAll 2015 2015
(5) NoSizeNoReg 2015 2017
(6) NoRegNoSize 2017 2015
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activities and payment types were maintained. Under constant regional diﬀerentiation
of payment rates (i.e. NoSize), payment rates are uniform at regional level. In all other
cases (i.e. NoAll, NoSizeNoReg, NoRegNoSize), uniform payment rates were calcu-
lated at the national level.
When the regional diﬀerentiation of payment rates was removed, a slightly diﬀerent
approach was used. Payment rates were still calculated per payment type and activity.
First, the payment sum per region, payment type and activity was calculated based on
activity levels in the base year and given national uniform payment rates. If farm-size
degressivity was maintained (i.e. NoReg), the step-wise payment rates in the base year
were adjusted with the percentage change of the payment sum calculated in the ﬁrst
step and the payment sum in the base year. If, in addition, farm-size degressivity was
abolished (i.e. NoAll, NoSizeNoReg, NoRegNoSize), the calculation of payment rates
followed the method described above.
The policy changes were implemented in one step (2015) in three scenarios (i.e.
NoSize, NoReg, NoAll) and in two steps (2015 and 2017) in the two other scenarios
(i.e. NoSizeNoReg, NoRegNoSize). Policy reforms are integrated step-wise over a
longer period to soften the adjustment process.
Trade policies were kept unchanged in all scenarios as the scenarios study domestic
policy reform only. The ﬁnal simulation year was set to 2024. The most important
exogenous assumptions across all scenarios regard population growth (+1% per
annum at national level, using regional projections where growth rates diﬀer), income
growth (+2% per annum), and world market prices (–2% per annum, reﬂecting also a
strong NOK). Furthermore, wage rates are assumed to increase at 2% per annum and
returns to capital at 1.5% per annum. Results are compared to a baseline scenario (‘-
line’) in which payments and milk quotas are kept at their base year levels, but the
exogenous assumptions above are implemented over 10 years.
5. Selected Results
Based on its product, regional and farm group detail, the model produces a large
number of relevant results to inform policies which cannot be presented in full. As the
focus of the paper is on regional distribution of agriculture and on farm-structural
change, we present results on the regional distribution of farmed land, the regional
distribution of raw milk production, the number of exiting farms, and the develop-
ment of farm size measured in ha. To those speciﬁc results, we add overall informa-
tion on welfare, income, production, prices and payments.
Table 3 shows key results for 2024 which is the model’s last simulation year. Over-
all aggregated results remain about the same in all scenarios compared to the baseline.
This is true for welfare, income, production and prices (the latter two not reported).
Total welfare increases most compared to the baseline in the scenario with the imme-
diate implementation of a full policy shock (NoAll), though even so the change is very
small. In the two scenarios where policy reforms are delayed (i.e. implemented in two
steps), total welfare is still higher compared to a partial policy shock (NoSize, NoReg),
but slightly lower compared to the immediate implementation of the full policy shock.
The latter result comes as payments and the income of input supply owners are
slightly higher. However, the relative change in total welfare compared to the baseline
is at most 0.026% in all scenarios. The limited diﬀerences clearly reﬂect that payments
in our scenarios are redeﬁned such that overall spend remains virtually constant, while
the exogenous world market prices largely determine domestic Norwegian prices with
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unchanged border protection. Hence, the policy reforms basically redistribute income
within the farming sector without changing much overall production, input use and
activity levels.
All policy reforms clearly aﬀect the rate of structural change at the time of imple-
mentation, but much less so in the longer run. Figure 2 shows the rate of farms exiting
in a given year as a percentage of all farms in the previous year for the ex-post period
2000 to 2014 and the ex-ante period 2014–2024. Partly due to increasing support,
structural change has been reduced prior to 2014 from more than 6% to less than 2%
in terms of farm exits. Annual farm exit lies between 2–2.5% in the baseline. As
expected, the magnitude of structural change is positively correlated with the scope
Figure 2. Farm exit deﬁned as the share of farms exiting the sector of all farms in the previous
year by scenario (ex-post: 2000–2014, simulations: 2014–2024)
Table 3
Overall results (million €)
Baseline NoReg NoSize NoAll NoRegNoSize NoSizeNoReg
Consumer surplus 381,601 381,600 381,602 381,602 381,602 381,602
Farm income 2,954 2,949 2,946 2,940 2,942 2,940
Quota rents 162 166 162 164 166 167
Input supply
owners’ income
11,860 11,827 11,820 11,772 11,775 11,775
Payments 1,583 1,576 1,571 1,561 1,564 1,563
Total welfare 373,769 373,806 373,815 373,867 373,865 373,864
Source: Own calculations.
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and timing of a policy reform. Farms adjust in the current model setup quickly so that
the rate of structural change falls back to baseline levels shortly after implementation.
Farm exits peak at about 6% when both size-degressivity and regional diﬀerentiation
are removed immediately (NoAll). The eﬀects are considerably smaller when only
size-degressivity or regional diﬀerentiation is removed. Farm structural change
increases each time a policy reform is implemented. Two peaks appear in the scenarios
where the reforms are delayed between 2015 and 2017. Figure 2 shows that the aboli-
tion of size-degressivity has more signiﬁcant implications for farm exit than the
removal of regional diﬀerentiation. It is interesting to note that the impact of aboli-
tion of regional diﬀerentiation is higher after the abolition of size-degressivity (NoSi-
zeNoReg) than with size-degressivity in place (NoReg). The presence of size-
degressivity seems hence to weaken the eﬀect of removing regional diﬀerentiation,
while this eﬀect is not so pronounced in the opposite case. Table 4 shows that 8,306
farms leave the sector in this case between 2014 and 2024. Farm exit is lowest in the
baseline with 6,803 farms. Extending the time span of policy implementation by two
years reduces overall farm exit by about 100 farms. Size-degressivity seems to be more
important to avoid farm exits (7,704 farm exits) than regional diﬀerentiation (7,086
farm exits).
A higher number of farms exiting the sector translates into a larger average farm
size. However, this result is somewhat disturbed by the fact that total land use does
not remain constant in all scenarios. Land use is highest (872,500 ha) when only regio-
nal diﬀerentiation is removed and lowest (850,062 ha) when both diﬀerential features
are abolished at the same time, while land use in the base line is slightly above the low-
est value (853,315 ha).
Size-degressivity seems to support the existence of small farms. The number of
farms less than 6 ha and less than 10.45 ha is lower when size-degressivity is removed
(NoSize) than in the baseline. The two size classes are chosen to cover the lowest 10%
and 20% of farms in the baseline, respectively. Due to diﬀerences in total land use,
however, the average farm size is somewhat lower when size-degressivity is removed.
The number of farms exiting is highest when both characteristics are abolished. How-
ever, this does not lead to a higher average farm size compared to the baseline,
because total land use is also reduced. The relationship between farm size variance
and the removal of payment characteristics is ambiguous. If only farm-size degressiv-
ity or regional diﬀerentiation is removed, farm variance goes down, while variance
increases if both characteristics are abolished. Policy reforms in which both character-
istics are removed trigger larger adjustment processes which seemingly lead to a more
diverse farm structure.
Regional eﬀects on land use are shown in Figure 3 and exempliﬁed for the scenarios
‘NoSize’, ‘NoReg and ‘NoAll’. The darker the colour, the larger the reduction in land
use compared with the baseline for the year 2024. Regions with light grey or white col-
our experience an increase in land use. The Northernmost regions observe a fall in
land use by 4% when the regional diﬀerentiation in the support system is removed.
This is true also for regions in Western Norway and Southern Norway when size-
degressivity is abolished in addition to regional diﬀerentiation. As will be explained
below, farms in these regions are in general smaller compared to farms in Eastern
Norway, South-West Norway and Central Norway. Therefore, the abolition of size-
degressivity also has regionally diﬀerentiated impacts. It appears that the regional dif-
ferentiation of the payment system is more important to achieve the policy objective
of maintaining agriculture across the country than size-degressivity.
 2018 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Table 5 shows farm size and payment per ha by scenario and simulation year for
two major groups of regions: central regions (Eastern Lowlands, Lowlands in Central
Norway, South-West Norway) and rural regions (Northern Norway, Western Nor-
way, Southern Norway, Valleys in Eastern and Central Norway). The regional divi-
sion is closely related to the shading of regions in Figure 3. Darker (lighter) shaded
regions belong to rural (central) regions.
The average farm size in central regions is higher compared to rural regions, caused
by diﬀerences in the type of production and natural conditions. Cereal farming is
mainly located in central regions, and cereal farms are commonly larger than dairy
farms or sheep farms, which are often located in more rural regions. In the baseline,
average farm size increases more in central regions compared to rural regions. The
impact of the scenarios on structural change for the two groups of regions is
Table 5
Farm size and payments by region and policy scenario
Scenario and
simulation year
Average farm size (ha) Payment (€ per ha)
Central regions Rural regions Central regions Rural regions
Baseline 2014 33.58 25.30 1,363 2,067
Baseline 2024 41.73 27.50 1,405 2,124
NoSize 2024 41.69 28.08 1,412 2,160
NoReg 2024 41.46 27.63 1,563 2,022
NoAll 2024 41.41 28.38 1,646 2,017
NoSizeNoReg 2024 41.80 28.30 1,646 2,008
NoRegNoSize 2024 41.70 28.35 1,643 2,012
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 3. Percentage change land use per region for scenarios with immediate policy change
compared to baseline in 2024
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ambiguous. In central regions, the removal of size-degressivity and regional diﬀerenti-
ation has very little impact on average farm size, while size-degressivity increases the
average farm size in rural regions, though marginally. An explanation for that result
is found in the redistribution of payments induced by the scenarios. The abolition of
both regional diﬀerentiation and size-degressivity boosts payments in the central
regions. As a consequence, farm income increases in central regions reduces the prob-
ability of farm exit and leads to less structural change. The opposite is true for farms
in rural regions. Here, payments decrease, reduce farm income and increase the prob-
ability of farm exit. Therefore, the increase in average farm size is bigger in rural
regions compared to central regions.
6. Summary and Conclusions
We present a recursive-dynamic multi-commodity model, Agrispace, for Norwegian
agricultural policy analysis covering 19 food and agricultural products, 32 regions
and up to 16 aggregate farm clusters in each region derived from statistical analysis.
The model uses explicit CES production functions and depicts competition for pri-
mary factors based on CET transformation functions and farm supply from the
household to the farm. Agrispace is based on data on the entire farm population in
Norway. That richness is maintained in simulations as payments are calculated annu-
ally for each single farm while production and input use at farm level are estimated
from simulated results at farm cluster level. This allows the model to reﬂect the com-
plex payment rules in Norwegian agricultural policy based on farm-size degressivity
and regional diﬀerentiation of payment rates.
We apply the model to scenarios where payments are made partially or completely
uniform, while total payments are kept constant with respect to activity levels in the
base year. The policy reforms reshuﬄe proﬁtability between types of production, geo-
graphical location and farm size and create second-order eﬀects through adjustments
at the farm level. Farm-size degressivity of payment rates has a larger impact on farm-
structural change than the regional diﬀerentiation of payment rates. In addition, milk
quotas at the county level prevent regional specialisation of dairy production. In this
respect, the current policy regime seems to support the policy objective of maintaining
a variety of farms in all parts of Norway.
The farm sector is far less aﬀected by the analysed policy reforms at aggregate
national level compared to regional level. There are two reasons for this. First, the
reforms only redistribute farm support between farms and regions, but do not reduce
the overall amount of support. Second, border protection remains unchanged in all
scenarios. Overall, the results demonstrate the models’ general ability to capture
impacts of detailed payment regulations that depend on the characteristics of single
farms. Moreover, the results indicate that those regulations indeed matter for the per-
formance of the agricultural sector in general and structural change in particular.
Hence, the main implication of this paper is to encourage the further development of
models that, to the extent possible, build on single farm characteristics and combine
these detailed data with the speciﬁcation of markets for agricultural inputs and
outputs.
The model results indicate that diﬀerences in the implementation of a policy reform
may have farm-structural eﬀects in the short run, but not necessarily in the long run.
Since the model abstracts from (quasi-)ﬁxed factor of production, adjustment pro-
cesses at the farm level take place immediately – there is little time lag between the
 2018 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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time of implementation and the time of adjustment. The timing of a policy reform is
an important decision variable to policy-makers, in particular when policy reforms
are costly and policy-makers may acquire new information as time goes by (Mitten-
zwei et al., 2012). The model currently requires a full description of the payment sys-
tem for all years between the base year and the ﬁnal simulation year. An interesting
avenue for future research would be to let the model update and adjust payments rates
and eligibility criteria based on policy objectives, past performance of the agricultural
sector and the economic framework conditions.
Structural change in the model is based on assumptions with regard to minimum
proﬁt levels depending on farm size and a stochastic component. The parameters of
these thresholds are calibrated based on observed farm structural change in the past.
Better knowledge about what drives farm exits in a Norwegian context and the rela-
tionship of farm exits to other farm variables would clearly improve the ability of the
model to reﬂect the eﬀects of policy reform on farm structural change.
Single farm data are available for Norway on a yearly basis back to 1999. Together
with information on payments, these data allow us to assess the model’s ability to sim-
ulate observed past farm structural change to validate the model and to improve its
parameterisation. This constitutes another important avenue for future research.
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